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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT*
OR those who love precision and definiteness the question of
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to social and
economic problems remains an irritating enigma. The judicial construction of due process of law and the equal protection of the law
has from the first discouraged systematic analysis and defied synthesis. More than one writer has emerged from the study of the
problem with a neat and compact set of fundamental principles, only
to have the Supreme Court discourteously ignore them in its next
case. But paradoxical as it may seem, those who long for a wise
and fonvard-looking solution of modern social and economic problems may well rejoice that the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to those problems has, for the most part, been halting, changeable, chaotic, and conflicting. The process of trial and error by
which a social and economic interpretation of that amendment is
still being evolved has had certain very wholesome results. It has
prevented the petrifaction in our law of the earlier individualistic
doctrines of due process and equal protection of the law. At the
same time it has left the way open for the courts to correct by the
increased wisdom of the future the possible mistakes of the present,
and to adjust the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to social
and economic problems which are of necessity shifting and complex.1 The present paper aims to discuss one phase of this trial
and error process.

F

*This paper was read before a joint session of the American Political
Science Association, the American Economic Association, and the American
Sociological Society during the annual meetings of these societies at Pittsburgh, December, 1921.
1 "Extreme indefiniteness, however, appears in the light of a wise avoidance of irrevocable conclusions, if we apply to this phase of constitutional
law as a whole the test of political performance. The greatest defects of
the decisions from a legal standpoint constitute their saving grace. No constitutional right is asserted without placing in convenient juxtaposition a
saving on behalf of the public welfare. No rule has been formulated in
.such a manner as to embarrass an honorable retreat, and if an inconvenient
precedent is encountered there is little hesitation in overruling it. * * *"
F~ND, STANDARDS OF AM:etuCAN L"£GISI.A'l.'ION, 2u. See also Freund, Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 4 !LI.. L. REv. 623.
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For the purpose of the pre~ent discussion the problem of the
social and economic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
·may be stated somewhat as follows: In passing social and economic
legislation the legislature very commonly subjects the individual to
some form of compulsion or restraint in order to promote the community welfare.2 The power to do this, which we call the police
po~er, together with the powers of taxation and eminent domain,
are limited by the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbid the tah.1ng of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law" or the denial of "the equal protection of the law." While
neither of these clauses can be defined in a clean-cut manner, it
may be said that the due process clause forbids social legislation
which is arbitrary; that is, legislation which restricts individual
liberty or property rights more severely than the advantages to the
community can possibly justify.3 The equal protection of the law,
on the other hand, means protection against arbitrary discrimination or. class legislation.4 ·The whole problem of the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment to social legislation is bound up in the
practical construction which the courts give to the term "arbitrary."
Now, whether or not a workman's compensation act or a minimum
wage law is "arbitrary" is quite largely a question of opinion. Oo
this question of opinion the legislature in enacting the law has the
first word, while the 'courts in deciding whether the law is constit1,ltional have the last word. 5 And one of the delicate questions
which the courts have had to face is this: in deciding whether a
piece of social legislation violates due process of law or the equal
protection of the law, how much weight ought a court to give to
2 Freund characterizes the police power as follows: "It aims directly
to secure and promote the public welfare, and it does so by restraint and
compulsion." POLIO> PowER, § 3.
3 Typical statements of this well-settled rule may be found. in the following cases: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 (1906);
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 (1904); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U. S. II (1905); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 (1915). See 12 CORPUS
Jurus, 931, and cases cited.
4 Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897); Connolly v.
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902); Lindsley v. Natural Carboni«;:
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 6I (19u); also HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 143.
5 For a clear statement of this rule see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623,
666 (1887).
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the formally pronounced opinion of the legislature that the act in
question is not arbitrary but is amply justified by existing social
needs? The judicial attitude toward this question has undergone
some very interesting changes during the fifty years which have
elapsed since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The writer
·believes that it has passed through three distinct phases, and is on
the verge of entering upon a fourth. It is the purpose of this paper
to trace these changes and to indicate the significance of each.

I. PERIOD oF JUDICIAL NoN-IN'l'ERFErutNCE-EAru,v VIEW
·

THAT

FouR'l'EEN'l'E AMENDMENT no:es NO'!' LIMIT STA'l'Es IN
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

The first position which the courts assumed in construing the
Fourteenth Amendment had the great advantage of being simple
and definite, and it does not therefore require extended comment.
So far as it relates to our present problem, it may be summarized
thus : whatever new guaranties were created by the amendment were
created for the benefit of the newly freed black man and were inapplicable to exercises of legislative power which did not involve
racial oppression or discrimination. 6 This doctrine was ·clearly
announced by Mr. Justice Miller in the Slaughter H oitse cases,7 in
which he expressed his belief that the amendment would never be
applied except to cases involving the rights of freedmen. It was
even more strikingly expressed in the Granger cases, of which Mim11
v. Illinois is the most important, in which the court declared that
the due process dause afforded no protection against an unreasonable regulation by the legislature of public utility rates. "For protection against abuses by the legislatures,'' runs the opinion of Chief
Justice Waite, "the people must resort to the polls, not to the
6 The early history and construction ctf the Fourteenth Amendment is
discussed in a scholarly article by Professor Corwin, The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643. The writer has drawn
heavily upon this article.
7 "We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision [equal
protection of the law clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race and
that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to
any other." 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1876).
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courts." 8 And while this was dictmn so far as the Munn case was
concerned, it seems to represent the views of a majority of the court
for upwards of a decade. We also find ·Mr. Justice Miller, who
had \vritten the opinion of the majority in the Slaughter House
cases, complaining in a still lateri decision of the existence of "some
strange misconception" as to the scope of the due process clause
which causes it to be regarded "as a means of bringing to the test
of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a state court of the justice of the decision against
him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision
may be founded." 9 And even more significant is the fact that in
the case of Loan, Association v. Topeka1-0 the court held that a state
tax levied for a private purpose was unconstitutional, not because
it violated the guarantee of due process of law, but because it contravened those limitations upon legislative power "which grow out
of the nature of all free governments," and which the court called
"reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact <:ould not exist. " 11 In other words, the court invalidated the
statute without pointing to any constitutional clause with which it
was in conflict, apparently without even considering the possibility
of finding in the due process clause of the newly adopted Fourteenth
Amendment a positive and specific prohibition against such legislation.12
8 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. u3, 134 (1876).
Compare Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 1Zj U. S. 678, 686, decided in
1887: "If all that can be said of this legislation is that it is unwise, or
unnecessarily oppressive to those manufacturing or selling wholesome oleomargarine, as an article of food, their appeal must be to the legislature, or
to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary."
9 Davidson v. New Orleans, g6 U. S. C.Jl, 104 (1878).
10 20 Wall. 655 (1875).
11 Some writers have assumed that this case rested upon the basis of
the due process clause. A careful reading of the case will show that this
is not correct. Professor Corwin explains this on the ground that since
the Supreme Court took jurisdiction in the case upon the ground of diversity of citizenship it was not necessary for it to consider the federal question of a possible violation of due process of law. See Corwin, op. cit., 7
M1cH. L. REv. 654
12 It is interesting that the courts in later decisions have generally preferred to rest the prohibition against taxation for a private- purpose upon

.
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It may be said, then, that the Supreme Court began its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by announcing and applying
the doctrine of judicial non-interference with social and economic
legislation. The amendment was held to give the court no authority
to examine or revise the determinations of the legislature that social
and economic conditions justify statutory interference with individual liberty. That determination was conclusive. 13

II. Tm;;

PERIOD oF JumcIAI, RUTHLESSNESS-MECHANICAL AND

l,EGALISTEC INTERPRETATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

In adopting the doctrine of judicial non-interference just described,
the Supreme Court thoughtfully safeguarded its future peace of
mind by refusing to give any authoritative definition of due process
of law or equal protection of 1the law. The meaning of these clauses,
said the court, would have to be evolved 'by the process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion.14 The way was thus discreetly left open
for a change in the judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was only a matter of a few years before that change
had taken place; and by the middle eighties we find the courts standing openly and triumphantly for the doctrine that the Fourteenth
the authority of Loan Association v. Topeka, supra, and the doctrine of
"fundamental principles" therein set forth, rather than to place it squarely
upon the ground of due process. See the careful study by McBain, Taxation
for a Private Purpose, 29 Por.. Scr. QuAR'.l'. 185. That the rule now rests
upon the due process clause, however, seems to be clear from the language
of the Supreme Court in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.
S. n2 (1897); Jones v. Portland, 245 U. '8. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier,
253 u. s. 233 (1920).
13 It may be noted that the first American case involving the validity of
a legislative restriction on women's hours of labor was decided in 1876,
Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383. The law was sustained.
Nothing was said about the Fourteenth Amendment, and it seems clear that
it did not occur to anyone that its restrictions had any bearing on the problem.
14 "But apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition
which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and satisfactory, there
is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and application of
such an important phrase in the. Federal Constitution, by the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall
require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded."
Davidson v. New Orleans, g6 U. S. 97, 104 (1878).
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Amendment imposes judically enforceable restrictions upon social
Iegisla;tion.15
It was probably inevitable that the judicial attitude toward the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment should change. It is
certainly not difficult to explain why it did so. In the first place,
the Supreme Court itself undenvent a thoroughgoing change in personnel. Five new justices took their seats between 1875 and 1885.16
When Mr. Justice Miller died in l8go he left behind him on the
bench but one colleague who had sat with him in the Slaughter
House cases, and that colleague, Mr. Justice Field, had from the
outset been an outspoken and dogmatic apostle of the new faith. 17
This fact need not be over-emphasized, b~t it is not entirely without significance that a majority of the court was by then made up
of justices whose service on the Supreme Court had begun after
the close of the Civil War. This perhaps suggests a second reason
for the change in judicial attitude under discussion; the fact that
with the gradual adjustment of the problems of reconstruction, both
political and constitutional, the immediate post bellum conditions
which had stimulated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
became less vivid in men's minds and ceased to present so strong
an argument against a broad and general application of the clauses
of that amendment.18 There is to be ta]_{en into account, in the third
place, a more or less continuous pressure brought to bear upon the
court by the bar and by interests desiring protection against unwelcome legislative interference, to adopt a broader interpretation of
due process of law. Mr. Justice Miller's lecture to the legal pro15 This development is clearly traced by Professor Corwin, op. cit., 7
MICH. L. R.Ev. 643. See BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, Ch. III,
entitled "The Revolution in Politics and Law."
1 6 These were Justices Harlan, Woods, Matthews, Gray, and Blatchford.
17 See the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Field in the Slaughter House
cases, supra, in which he urged that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
to citizens of the United States the fundamental rights belonging to the
citizens of all free governments.

18 Professor Corwin suggests that the fear which the court had originally felt that under the Fourteenth Amendment congressional legislation
would be substituted for state legislation after the fashion of the Civil Rights
Act had by this time been eliminated by the decisions invalidating the last
of those acts, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. REv. 656.
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fession on this point in the _case above referred to19 seems to have
had no effect. Counsel seeking relief for their clients continued to
urge that the due process clause ought reasonably to be construed
so as to afford protection against arbitrary and unreasonable exercises of legislative power. They were also able to bring evidence
to the attention of the court that its original view of the intentions
of the framers of the amendment was not historically sound and
that the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment had really been
designed for the protection of private rights of liberty and property generally and not exclusively for the ·protection of the negro.20
And finally, as the movement for the regulation of public utility
rates continued, and as the newer movement for protective social
and labor legislation set in, a court which in 1875 was willing in
the Loan Association case to nullify a state law on no stated constitutional grounds, but on an alleged violation of natural rights,
could hardly be expected to stand pat on the rather indiscreet dictum
in the Munn case that for "protection of abuses of legislative power
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts."
Supra, p. 739.
In 1882, in arguing the case of San Mateo County v. Southern Pac.
R. Co., n6 U. S. 138 (1885), before the Supreme Court, Mr. Roscoe Conkling, who had been a member of the Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction
which had drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, produced in court the unpublished journal of the committee to support his contention that the amendment had not been originally intended for the exclusive protection of the
negro race. See TAYLOR, Du:e PRoc:Ess oF LAW, 32. This journal has been
published with critical comments. KsNDRICK, TH:e JouRNAI. oF 'l'HJ> JoIN'l'
COM.llHTTl>t oF F1FT:ei>N ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Congress, 1865-1867, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Vol. 62. For
an analysis of the intentions of Congress in passing the Fourteenth Amendment see Fr.ACK, THE ADOPTION oF 'l'H:e FoURTJ>l>N'l'H AM:eNDM:eN'l'; passim,, also
Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. R:ev. 643. In 1900 Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the court in Ma.xwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 591, referred to the
narrow construction which had been given to the Fourteenth Amendment
in the Slaughter House cases and said that the "suggestion that only discrimination by a state against the negroes as a class or on account of their
race was covered by the amendment as to the equal protection of the laws
has not been affirmed by the later cases. * * * That the primary reason for
that amendment was to secure the full enjoyment of liberty to the colored
race is not denied, yet it is not restricted to that purpose, and it applies to
everyone, white or black, that comes within its provisions."
19

20
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Even a casual examination of this new judicial attitude will indicate how thoroughgoing a revolution it wrought in our constitutional law. This new doctrine involved two things. First, it
imposed upon the courts a new duty, the duty of applying to social
l~gislation the limitations of due process of law and equal protection
of the law. Secondly, this duty made it necessary for the courts
to determine just how the guaranties of due process and equal protection of the law could be used as yardsticks for measuring the
validity of social legislation. It is interesting and instructive to
see how the courts approached this problem.
It must be borne in mind that at this time it was the recognized
theory of the judicial function that -courts do not make law, they
merely find or discover law. 21 Mr. Morris R. Cohen has called this
the "phonograph" theory of judicial construction, in which the
judge is merely a vocal medium through which the preexistillg legal
principles are given expression. 22 These principles are absolute and
immutable and the judge has no responsibility for them except to
see that they are applied in pertinent cases. But in applying the
Fourteenth Amendment to social legislation the task was not so
simple as the theory. There were no prii.iciples of law to be discovered. The guaranties -of due process and equal protection of
the law had never been applied as restrictions upon the general
2 1 This theory is critically treated in GRAY, Tm; NATURE AND SOURCES
OF THE LAW, Ch. IV. See also Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law,
24 AMER. L. R.Ev. 752, as well as his "LAW, ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION." Dean Pound has given us the following graphic statement of the
theory: "A German writer has put the received theory thus: The court is
an automaton, a sorll of judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery has
been provided in advance by legislation or by received legal principles; and
one has but to put in .the facts above and draw out the decision below.
True, he says, the facts do not always fit the machinery, and hence we
may have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything
out. But even in extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic,
the decision is attributed, not at all to the thumping and joggling process,
but solely to the machine." Courts and Legislation, 7 AMER. PoL. Sci. REv.
361, 364.
2 2 The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AMER. L. R.Ev. 161, 164 Compare with this early rigid conception of law Mr. Justice Holmes' interesting
suggestion that "the prophecies of what the courts will do in. fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by law." COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 173.
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legislative power of the states. Equal protection of the law was
a brand new guarantee so far as the federal Constitution was concerned ;23 and due process of law had been limited in its previous
construction to matters of law enforcement, procedure, and racial
oppression. 24 Now what does a court do when it has to "find" law
where there is none? Naturally, but without undue publicity, it
draws upon its own ideas as to what the absolute, eternal, and
immutable principles of law ought to be with reference to the case
in question. And this is exactly what the ~ourts did in applying
the Fourteenth Amendment to social and economic legislation during this period of judical self-assertion. They read into the phrases
"due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" the meaning
derived from their own training and intellectual background. They
translated the clauses in question into the terms of the economic
doctrine and the political and juridical philosophy which had served
the vastly simpler speculative needs of the pioneer society of the
forties and fifties. We may pause for a moment to consider what
this meant concretely. 2 "
In the first place, it meant the application of a laissez faire doc23 The federal Bill of Rights contains no guarantee of the equal protection of the law. Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, there has been a tendency upon the part of the courts to regard the
du(\ process clause and the equal protection of the law clause as overlapping
to a large extent. As one authority puts it, "the broad interpretation which
the prohibition as to 'due process of law' has received is sufficient to cover
very many of the acts which, if committed by the states, might be attacked
as denying equal protection." Wn.I.OUGHBY ON CoNSTITUTION, II, 874. See
also Chief Justice Taft's discussion of this point in the recent case of Truax
v. Corrigan, Adv. Opin., Oct. Term, 1921, 132, 138.
2 4 Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. ~v. 643.
For a careful study of the
narrow application given to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil vVar,
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 46o.
2s PouND, THE SPIRIT oF THE Co:r.ruoN LAW, Chapters IV and VI. See
Mr. Justice Holmes' celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45, 75 (1905) : "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a
large part of the country does not entertain. * * * The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics * * * a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez

faire."
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trine to the problem of the nature and extent of the legislative regulation of businesses affected with a public interest, and the problem
of what the public purposes are for which property may be taken
by eminent domain. There is no space for detail, but merely for
an illustration or two. The doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, already
stated 26 was by gradual steps modified and finally discarde<;l, 27 and
in its place we have the declaration by the Supreme Court that a
legislative regulation of public utility rates amounts to a deprivation
of property without due process of law if it does not allow a return
on the capital investment of at least six per cent.28 .We find the
public uses for which alone, under due process of law, private property might be taken by eminent domain limited in meaning in the
main to be synonymous with "use by the public," a doctrine which
placed legislative discretion almost at the vanishing point. 29
In the second place, in applying the F;ourteenth Amendment to
the legislative exercises of the police power, the courts again evolved
principles of law which embody a pronounced individualism. The
quintessence of this individualism is to be found in the well-known
doctrine of "liberty of contract," in terms of which the due process
clause began to be construed in the state courts in the later eighties. 30
This doctrine of liberty of contract had great plausibility. It
asserted in substance that when two parties came together to reach
an agreement that was not contrary to public policy the legislature
26

Supra, p. 739·
This interesting development is traced by Corwin, The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. RlW. 643. See also BEARD, CoN~MPORARY AMilRICAN HISTORY, 67-87.
28 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas ~o., 2I2 U. S. 19 (I909).
20 The rule that private property may be taken by eminent domain only
for a public purpose was not definitely subsumed under the guarantee of
due process of laW' until the decision in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago,
I66 U. S. 226 (IS¢). For the early development of the rule see McBain,
Taxation for a Private Purpose, 29 Por.. ScI. QUAR'.L\ I85, I87, and note.
For discussionJ of the "use by the public" rule in the law of eminent domain
see LEWIS, E:MINEN'l' DOMAIN, Ch. VII.
30 The doctrine seems first to have been announced in Godcharles v.
W:igeman, II3 Pa. St. 43I (I886), and Millett v. People, II7 Ill. 294 (I886).
For elaborate discussion of the doctrine see Pound, Liberty of Contract, I8
YALE L. JouR 454; also FoSTER, LIBERTY oF CONTRACT AND LABOR LAws.
21
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had no right to interfere and to dictate the terms of that agreement
or the conditions under which it should be made or <:arried out.
The concept of individual liberty which provided the philosophical
basis of this doctrine had formed the essence of radicalism a century before; and the jurists of this period, having gulped down Sir
Henry Maine's dogma that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract,''31
regarded themselves as the apostles of a liberal faith. 32 It was only
by the relentless application of the doctrine of liberty of contract
that the fruits of progress could be saved from the onslaughts of
reaction. Wholesome as that doctrine undoubtedly was and is in
certain aspects and applied in certain situations, the juristic application of it during this period produced some very startling results.
Applied concretely, it came to mean that the legislature had no more
power to control the contract of employment between the Pennsylvania Railroad and one of its switchmen than to control the contract
of sale between two farmers haggling over the price of a cow. It
meant that the state could not disturb the sacred right of an adult
woman to work "at any time of the day that suits her" 33 or as many
hours during the day and night as she might wish.S.J. In short, this
liberty of contract doctrine raised an almost insuperable barrier
a1 MAINE, THE ANCIENT LAW [Pollock's Ed.], 165. For criticism of
this application of Maine's theory see POUND, THE SPIRIT oF THE CoMMON

LAw, 28.
32 A most interesting expression of this point of view occurs in the
Preface to the Second Edition of GRAY"s R.i>sTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION
oF PROPER'rY (1895), in which, in protesting against the doctrine of spendthrift trusts, the author writes: "Now things are changed. There is a
strong and increasing feeling, which has already led to many practical results,
that a main object of the law is not to secure liberty of contract, but to
restrain it, in the interest, or supposed interest, of the weaker, or supposed
weaker, against the stronger, or supposed stronger, portion of the community. Hence, for instance, laws enacted or contemplated for eight hours'
labor, for weekly payments of wages by corporations, for 'compulsory arbitration,' etc., that is, laws intended to take away from certain classes of the
community, for their supposed good, their liberty of action and their power
of contract; in other words, attempts to ,bring society back to aii organizatio1i founded 01i status and not upon contract." (Writer's italics.)
33 People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131 (1907).
34 Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98 (1895).
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against what seem now the mildest forms of protective labor legislation.35
The guarantee of the equal protection of the law, on the other
hand, received an equally individualistic interpretation, borrowed
from the common law. That interpretation did not deny the validity
of all class legislation enacted in the e.,'{ercise of the police power,
but it recognized the propriety of only one classification, that based
upon the common law distinction between persons who are sui juris
and those who are not. 36 This meant, in substance, -that social or
economic legislation must treat alike all persons except infants,
lunatics, wards, or those under some other definite legal disability.
Here, of course, is the key to the refusal of the courts during this
period to allow the legislatures to accord special protection to women
in industry. 37 Here is also to be found the underlying philosophy
of the following typicai judicial utterance invalidating a legislative
regulation of the time and method of wage payment in certain industries :88 "The workingman of intelligence is treated as an imbecile.
Being over 2r years of age, and not a lunatic or insane, he is deprived
of the right to make a contrac~ as to the time when his wages shall
become due. Being of sound mind, and knowing the value of a
horse, he is not allowed to make an agreement with the corporation
that he will work sixty days and take the horse in payment." By
this rigid and legalistic construction of the requirements of equal ,
protection of the law the courts invalidated long lists of police regulations designed to improve the conditions prevailing in particular
industries or to benefit particular classes.
Now in applying these doctrines, what respect did the courts
accord to the opinion of the legislature, embodied in statutes, that
prevailing social and economic conditions justified and demanded
one of the forms of social legislation above mentioned? That
respect was certainly scant.39 The attitude assumed by the courts
35 Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YAL~ L. JouR. 454. For elaborate citation of cases see FOSTER, LmtRTY oF CoNTRAC'l' AND LABOR LAWS, passim.
36 Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. Rev. 664 Seager, The Attitude of American Courts Toward Restrictive Labor Laws, 19 POL. Scr. QUART. 589.
37 Ritchie v. People, and People v. Williams, siipra.
as Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 127 Cal. 4, I I (1899).
B9 Sir Frederick Pollock criticises the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Lochner case, sitpra, upon this ground: "The legal weakness of this
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toward such legislation was usually one of suspicion, not infrequently
one of open hostility,40 and almost invariably one which placed upon
the shoulders of those defending the legislation the burden of proving
it to be constitutional.41 The time-honored doctrine that laws are
presumed to be valid until proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be
otherwise seemed to be forgotten or ignored. 42 The courts admitted
reasoning, if we may say so, is that no credit seems to be given to the state
legislature for knowing its own business, and it is treated like an inferior
court which has to give affirmative proof of its competence." The New York
Labour Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 2I LAW, QuAR'l.' REv. 2II.
40 "When it is sought, under the guise of a labor law, arbitrarily, as
here, to prevent an adult female citizen from working at any time of the
day that suits her, I think it is time to call a halt. * * * The tendency of
legislatures, in the form of regulatory measures, to interfere with the lawful pursuits of citizens, is becoming a marked one in this country, and it
behooves the courts firmly and fearlessly to interpose the barriers of their
judgments when invoked to protect against legislative acts plainly transcending the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative body."
People v. Williams, I8g N. Y. 131, 135 (I907).
41 "There is no reasonable ground-at least none which has been made
manifest to us in arguments of counsel-for fixing upon eight hours in
one day as the limit within which woman can work without injury to her
physique, and beyond which, if she work, injury will necessarily -follow."
Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, II4 (I8g5). "When a health law is challenged
as unconstitutional on the ground that it arbitrarily interferes with personal
liberty and private property without due process of law, the courts must be
able to see that it has, at least in, fact, some relation to public health, and
that the public health is the end actually aimed at, and that it is appropriate
and adapted to that end. * * * It cannot be perceived how the cigarmaker is
to be improved in his health or morals by forcing him from his home and its
hallowed associations and beneficent influences, to ply his trade elsewhere."
In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. g8, II5 (I885). "To the common understanding tqe
trade of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one." Lochner
v. New York, supra, at p. 59.
42 For the nature and development of the doctrine of reasonable doubt
see the writer's paper, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the
Court, 19 MICH. L. REv. 77I. It is, of course, obvious that if the courts
recognize the propriety of legislative classifications based only upon the distinction between those who are sui jttris and those who are not, they have
automatically created a presumption which shifts the burden of proof onto
those who defend any other basis of classification. See Corwin, op. cit., 7
MICH. L. Rsv. 666.
"Where any doubt as to the constitutionality of such statutes could find
lodgment, courts all too frequently declared the acts void." Brandeis, The
Living Law, IO Iu.. L. REv. 46!, 464.
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that there were cases in which liberty of contract or other private
rights might be restricted by police legislation without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment, but they demanded that a positive justification for each new restriction should be clearly made out. And
withal, they assumed in many cases an attitude very like that of the
belligerent Irishman who announced to his friend, "I am open to
conviction, but show me the man who· can convince me."
That the burden of proof irt respect to constitutionality should
be thus shifted onto the shoulders of the proponents of social and
economic legislation was highly important; but it was even more
important that the burden of proof could be assumed, not by the
presentation of evidence as to actual social and economic conditions,
but rather by the citing of precedents and the matching of legal
arguments. The idea that the validity of a police regulation might
really depend upon whether certain social or economic needs did or
did not exist was quite abhorrent to the judicial mind. Thus, in
the Ives case the New York Court of Appeals ruled out the evidence presented to show that an employer's liability act was a legitimate exercise of the police power. 43 It said:
"The report of the Commission is based upon a most
voluminous array of statistical tables, extracts from the
works of philosophical writers and tl:ie industrial laws of
many countries, all of which are designed to show that our
own system of dealing with industrial accidents is economically, morally and legally unsound. Under our form of
government, however, courts must regard all economic,
philosophical and moral theories, attractive and desirable
though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question
whether they can be molded into statutes without infringing
upon the letter or spirit of our written constitutions. * * * In
a government like ours theories of public good or necessity are often so plausible or sound as to command popular
approval, but the courts are not permitted to forget that law
is the only chart by which the ship of state is to be guided."
In fact, in their mechanical and legalistic construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment so little cognizance did the courts take of
43

Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 287, 295 (19n).
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the realities of modern life that we find a substantial group of cases
in which protective labor laws are held invalid as imposing burdensome and arbitrary restrictions upon the very laborers themselves. 44
These opinions breathe forth judicial tenderness and concern for
the unfortunate workingman, and with hearty enthusiasm the courts
proceeded to rescue him from an attempted legislative oppression
which, by subjecting him to the legal requirements of reasonable
hours and conditions of labor, infringed thus brutally upon his
sacred right of free contract.
It is not difficult to show that methods just described, by which
the courts of this period applied the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment to social and economic qu_estions, carried in their wake
a whole brood of evils. In the first place, the reasonable and necessary legislative adjustment of pressing problems was unduly postponed by a series of reactionary decisions wholly out of keeping
with the spirit of modem times. American states found themselves,
temporarily at least, without power to correct social and economic
ills which other self-respecting nations had long since ceased to
tolerate. This in itself was unfortunate. Furthermore, these results
led to a popular criticism and distrust of the courts which has been
even more unfortunate. No one will deny that much of this criticism was ill-advised and that the layman frequently knew very
little about the actual merits of the laws in question or the constitutional issues involved. What the layman did grasp was this :
that the courts by the application of vague principles and abstract
legal concepts managed to defeat the efforts of the legislature to
correct social and economic evils which needed correction. He
refused to be swindled by the very obvious fiction that the courts
44 In re Jacobs, g8 N. Y. 98 (1885); Ritchie v. People, 115 Ill. g8 (1895);
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886) ; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415
(1899); People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131 (1907). The Supreme Court,
however, has not taken very kindly to the idea that employers may plead
the wrongs of their employees as well ;is their own in attacking labor legislation. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898), the court said that
such an argument "would certainly come with better grace and greater
cogency from the latter class." In a later decision the court declared bluntly,
"The -contention may be limited at the outset to the rights of the company.
It cannot complain for its employees. * *
Erie R Co. v. Williams, 233
u. s. 685, 697 (1914).
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were "finding" the law in these cases instead of "making" it ; 4 ~
and he soon lifted his voice in protest and -came finally to demand
such drastic measures as the recall of judges or decisions, or even
the total abolition of the power of judicial review. The courts
found themselves in the thick of social, economic, and political controversies, the objects of popular suspicion and hostility. The very
principle of an independent judiciary came to be questioned.46 The
ugly results of this loss of popular -confidence in the courts are not
to be minimized by arguing that it was partially or even wholly
undeserved. In an oft-quoted sentence Lord Herschell once declared
that "Important as it was that the people should get justice, it was
even more important that they should be made to see and feel that
they were getting it" ;47 and for practical purposes it is almost as
45 "While the lawyer believes that the principles of law are absolute,
eternal, and of universal validity, and that law is found, not made, the people
believe no less firmly that it may be made and that they have the power to
make it." Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AMER.. PoL. Scr. Rsv. 36!, 375.
46 It may not be irrelevant to suggest that the popular theory that judges
directly responsible to the people through direct election will be more liberal
in matters of constitutional construction does not seem to be borne out by
the facts. Dean J. P. Hall has put this very clearly: "No elective courts
exceed in liberality toward the legislature the United States Supreme Court
or those of Massachusetts and New: Jersey, and only a very few equal them.
Appointive courts have rarely construed constitutions as narrowly as have
the elected courts of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Washington, and West Virginia upon numerous occasions, and sometimes those of New York, California, and Colorado. In fact, so far as I can determine from a somewhat
careful survey of the matter, the circumstance that judges have been elected
or that they have been appointed cannot be shown to have had any appreciable direct bearing upon their decision of questions of constitutional policy.
A judge of first-class ability is decidedly more likely to accord a rational
freedom of choice to the legislature upon controverted points than is a
judge of less ability, because, while all judges, from the very nature of their
function, are likely to have a predominantly conservative cast of mind, that
of the able judge is an intellectual conservatism, while that of his inferior
has become instinctive, and what is novel naturally appears dangerous. The
former is therefore more open to conviction, and as the appointive judges
are, on the whole, somewhat superior in ability to the elected ones, they are
therefore somewhat more liberal. This influence, however, is wholly indirect." The Selection, Tenure, and Retirement of Judges, Bulletin X of the
American Judicature Society.
47 Atlay, Victorian Chancellors, II, 46o, quoted by Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. Ri>v. 605.
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important today that the people should actually respect and trust
the courts as that the courts should deserve that respect and trust.
And finally, the somewhat arrogant attitude of the courts during
this period resulted in a falling off of a wholesome sense of responsibility upon the part of our legislative bodies. The lmowledge
that the supreme court of the state would interpose a judicial barrier to the actual enforcement of legislation in questionable cases
led many a legislature to build up its political fences by enacting
legislation which was unconstitutional, and which was known by
those who enacted it to be unconstitutional. The legislature reaped
the credit of being progressive and responsive to the people's will;
the court fell heir to the unpopularity resulting from declaring the
legislation void. It will be a long and painful process to build up
again the sturdy sense on the part of legislators that they must
assume responsibility for the constitutionality of the laws they pass.
This second period or phase in the development of the social
and economic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment may be
characterized then as one in which the courts ruthlessly overrode
the determinations of the legislature that social and economic conditions justified and demanded legislative regulation; and in so
doing they relied almost exclusively upon abstract legal concepts
and ruled out as irrelevant any consideration of social and economic
facts.

III.

REALISTIC INTERP1$TATIONI, OF '!'HE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
-THE CouRTS AS SOCIAL AND EcoNOMIC ExP~RTs

During the period just discussed we ·find the courts applying to
the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment what Dean Pound
has called "a jurisprudence of conceptions,"48 under which social
and economic questions were to be solved in accordance with abstract
legal principles. In the period which began roughly about a dozen
years ago this reliance upon abstractions came gradually to be
replaced by reliance upon evidence as to actual economic and social
needs. In other words, to borrow Professor Frankfurter's phrase,
48 Courts and Legislation, 7 A!M$. Por,. Scr. R.Ev. 361 ; Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra.
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the courts began to inject "realism:' into our constitutional law,4 9
and began to act upon the idea that the question whether legislative
control of social and economic conditions was forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment might depend upon how acute was the
actual need for such control. And this question, of course, was
largely one of fact, and not of abstract legal theory. In short, the
courts came to recognize that their function in passing upon such
questions obliged them to assume the role of social and economic
experts.
There is not space to discuss in detail why this change of front
took place. But perhaps the most potent cause was the influence
of a little group of people who combined accurate legal knowledge
with an insight into modern social conditions and who conceived
the idea of presenting to the court the actual evidence to prove
that legislative regulation of social and economic conditions was
vitally necessary and for that reason constitutionally legitimate.50
The names most conspicuous in this group are those of Mr. Brandeis,51 Miss Josephine Goldmark, 52 and Professor Frankfurter.53
When the case of Muller v. Oregon54 came before the Supreme .
Court in 1908, Mr. Brandeis and Miss Goldmark filed their famous
brief in support of the Oregon Ten Hour Law for women, setting
forth at great length the physiological and social reasons why women
needed protection from over-long hours of labor. 55 No intelligent
group of men could shut out from their minds the telling force of
49

Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. Rev.

353.
50 There was certainly little in the briefs of counsel in the earlier cases
to inspire the courts to take a liberal view of questions of constitutionality
in close cases. As Mr. Brandeis expressed it, it was a case of "the blind
leading the blind." Living Law, 10 ILL. L. Rev. 46!, 470.
0 1 Mr. Brandeis' services in these cases were given without compensation. He continued actively in this work until his appointment to the Supreme
Court in 1916.
5 2 Publication Secretary of the National Consumers' League.
1
53 Professor of Law in Harvard University.
He took up this work
when Mr. Brandeis laid it down.
54 208 u.
412 ( 1!)08).
55 This brief forms Part II of Miss Goldmark's book, Fatigue and
Efficiency.

s.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

755

this presentation of facts. The Supreme Court succumbed to it,
and in the course of its opinion upholding the statute it said:
"The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin
may not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them
is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a
widespread belief that woman's physical structure and the
functions she performs in consequence thereof justify special legislation· restricting or qualifying the conditions under
which she should be permitted to toil. Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written
constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations
upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and
stability to popular government which otherwise would be
lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated
and debatable, and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to
that fact, a widespread and long-continued belief concerning
it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance
of all matters of general knowledge." 56
The real importance of this decision was not that a desirable
piece of protective labor legislation was upheld, but that in upholding it the court pretty plainly served notice that it approved the
novel technique with which the case had been argued.1> 7 The Muller
case marks the beginning of a line of cases in which briefs of this
new kind were filed and in which social legislation was sustained
because the courts showed themselves willing to weigh the social
and economic facts which those briefs so clearly set forth. 58 The
New York Court of Appeals took its place among the converts to
Italics are the writer's. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.
(1905).
s1 Frankfurter, op. cit., 29 HARV. L. Rev. 365. See Greeley, Changing
Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation, 5 ILL. L. R~v. 222.
58 Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509 (1910); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U. S.
718 (1914); Miller v. W~lson, 236 U. S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin,
236 U. S. 385 (1915); Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 (1914); same, 243 U.
S. 629 (1917); People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395 (1915).
50

S.
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the philosophy of "realism" in the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and with commendable frankness reversed its earlier
decision that the legislative prohibition of women's night work was
a violation of due process of law." 9
"There is no reason," said Judge Hiscock, "why we should be
reluctant to give effect to new and additional knowledge upon such
a subject as this, even if it did lead us to take a different view of
such a vastly important question as that of public health or disease
than formerly prevailed. Particularly do I feel that we should
give serious consideration and great weight to the fact that the
present legislation is based upon and sustained by an investigation
by the legislaturn deliberately and carefully made through an agency
of its own creation, the present factory investigating commission."
The supreme court of Illinois experienced a similar change of
heart, and for similar reasons, in respect to a ten-hour law for
women. 60
While this change of attitude upon the part of the courts was
not sudden nor universal, it came by degrees to be fairly representative of the modern judicial position: It involved two things.
It involved, first, a square recognition by the courts that the constitutionality of social and economic legislation depended in the
last analysis upon the actual existence or non-existence of social or
economic conditions justifying such legislation. In other words,
the old mechanical "jurisprudence of concepts" gave way_ to what
Dean Pound has called a "sociological jurisprudence."61 In the
second place, it resulted in throwing the burden of proof back onto
the shoulders of those who attacked the constitutionality of these
laws in most of the cases where any positive justification based on
facts was presented to the courts. Thus, in the case of State v.
Bunt-ing, in which the Oregon Ten Hour Law was sustained, we
find the Oregon supreme court, after commenting upon the social
and economic data contained in Professor Frankfurter's and Miss
59

People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N Y: 395, 412 (1915).

eo Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509 (1910).

a1The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GruitN BAG, 6o7; The
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. RF.v. 591, and
25 HARV. L. RF.v. 140, 489.
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Goldmark' s elaborate brief, declaring :62 "In order to warrant
declaring the act violative of the fundamental law, it should be
shown that in the light of the world's experience and common
knowledge the act under consideration is palpably and beyond reasonable doubt one that will not tend to protect or conserve the
public peace, health, or welfare in its enforcement." And this
statement accurately reflects the view taken in numerous decisions
handed down during the period under discussion. 63 ·
It seems to the writer that this third phase of the judicial attitude .
respecting the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment may be
summarized thus : The courts did not cease to be the active arbiters
of the validity of social and economic legislation, but they did adopt
the policy of deciding the question of that validity upon the basis
of social and economic facts. Legislative determinations still
received somewhat meager respect of their own weight, but whenever any substantial factual basis for the legislation could be found
either in evidence actually presented or in a consensus of public
opinion shared by the court the burden of proof was placed squarely
upon the shoulders of those who attacked the statute.

IV.

Tm~ PRESENT MovEMENT TowARD JumcIAr, SEr.F-DENIAr,SocIAr, AND EcoNOMIC QuESTION LEFT FOR LEGISI,ATIVE
DETERMINATION

An examination of the decisions of the courts, especially of the
Supreme Court of the United States during the last few years,
shows the growth of an even more liberal attitude toward social
and economic legislation than that just discussed. There is danger
of over-emphasizing the extent of this change. Every now and
then there occurs a recrudescence of the old dogmatic legalism which
raises the question whether this new judicial attitude may not,
after all, be merely the product of an optimistic imagination. 64 We
71 Ore. 259, 272 (1914).
oa "The burden is on him who attacks the legislation, and it is not sustained by declaring· a liberty of contract. It can only be sustained by dem62

onstrating that it conflicts with some constitutional restraint, or that the
public welfare is not subserved by the legislation." Erie R. Co. v. Williams,
233 u. s. 685 (1g14).
04 See the opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the recent case of Truax v.
Corrigan, Adv. Opin., Oct. Term, 1921, 132.
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may, however, examine its essential nature and what evidence there
is of its reality.
Many of the recent cases seem to reflect what may be called an
attitude of judicial self-denial or laissez faire, a willingness on the
part of the courts to regard the legislative determination that social
and economic conditions demand statutory regulation as a conclusive deteimination with which the courts will interfere only in
cases of the most obvious and palpable abuse of discretion. This
sounds, of course, very much like' the old orthodox doctrine that
l~ws are presumed to be valid until proved beyond reasonable doubt
to be otherwise. But closer scrutiny will reveal substantial practical, if not theoretical, differences. The true significance of this
new judicial attitude may best be made by showing its relation to
its predecessors. It was a great gain to have the courts recognize
that the validity of social and economic legislation depended primarily
upon questions of social and economic fact. But this attitude of
realism merely changed the standards in accordance with which
the courts decided those questions of legislative validity. Instead
of testing social and economic legislation by abstract, legalistic
standards, they tested it by what knowledge they had of social and
economic· facts. They welcomed the presentation of those facts
and treated any evidence regarding them with great respect. But
it was the court itself, assuming the role of social and economic
experts, which decided whether the facts existed and whether the
legislative exercise of the police power was more burdensome or
restrictive than the actual conditions warranted.
Now the new attitude which the courts show some signs of adopting differs from this position in this respect: The courts are coming
to recognize that the question whether social and economic conditions warrant certain kinds of social legislation is not a question of
law, as was at first assumed; nor a question of pure fact, as was
later assumed, but a question of opinion. It is a question which
cannot be answered dogmatically yes or no ; it is a question upon
_which honest and sensible people will inevitably differ. This question of opinion regarding the existence of social and economic
conditions or the actual necessity for remedial measures is not the
business of the courts to settle; that decision is for the legislature.
And unless it can be shown by a preponderance of evidence that
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the opinion of the legislature as to the need for social or economic
legislation is one which no reasonable and honest person could
form, that legislative determination is binding and conclusive upon
the courts. In other words, the question before the court is very
like the question presented to the judge who is asked to set aside
the verdict of a jury as being contrary to the weight of evidence;
that question is not, does the judge agree with the jury's verdict,
but is the verdict so palpably wrong that reasonable men could not
have reached it ?65 And so the question here is not, does the court
agree that the social and economic legislation is warranted by the
conditions, but could reasonable men have concluded that it was?
The proper sphere of legislative regulation of social and economic
conditions ceases to be defined in accordance with judicial tests of
reasonableness and becomes, to use the words of Professor Vance,
"substantially commensurate with the considered legislative policy
of the state." 66
It would be a great mistake to assume that this change in attitude on the part of courts has been of sudden origin, although the
currency which it has attained is in the main a fairly recent development. Tra~es of it are to be found, however, in judicial opinions
written thirty years ago. Perhaps its chlef exponent is Mr. Justice
Holmes ; and it has formed one of the chief planks in his philosophy of constitutional construction ever since he first held judicial
office.67 Little by little views first voiced by him du dissenting opinThayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. Riw. 167, 168; CASES
ON CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAW, I, 672; LEGAL EssAYS, 20-24
6 6 Coal Mining Affected with a Public Interest, 31 YAI.S L. JouR. 75.
0 7 In 18g1 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts invalidated a law forbidding employers to impose fines on employees for defective work, on the
ground that it violated the clause of the Massachusetts Constitution securing
to all the right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Mr.
Justice Holmes dissented in the following language: "It might be urged,
perhaps, that the power to make reasonable laws impliedly prohibits the
making of unreasonable ones, and that this law is unnecessary. If I assume
that this construction of the Constitution is correct, and that, speaking as a
political economist, I should agree in condemning tlie law, still I should not
be willing or think myself authorized to overturn legislation on that ground,
unless I thought that an honest difference of opinion was impossible or
pretty nearly so. * * * I suppose that this act was passed because the operatives, or some of them, thought that they were often cheated out of part
65
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ions have earned wider acceptance and are today being applied and
extended in a way which three decades ago it would have seemed
rash to predict. Gs
There is space to mention only a few of the more interesting
cases in which this new attitude of the courts is exemplified or
suggested. We find in the Supreme Court, for example, a growing
tendency to treat as conclusive the legislative determination that
police regulations are warranted by existing social conditions, especially if the state courts have upheld the law. In the case of Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, in which the Supreme Court sustained the
Oklahoma law establishing the guarantee of bank deposits, Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said :69
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs. * * * It may be put forth in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality o:r
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare. * * * If, then, th~ legislature of the
state thinks that the public welfare requires the measure under consideration, analogy and principle are in favor of the power to enact
it. * * * In short, when the Oklahoma legislature declares by implication that free banking is a public danger, and. that :incorporation,
of their wages under a false pretense that the work done by them was imperfect, and persuaded the legislature that their view was true. If their view
was true, I cannot doubt that the legislature had the right to deprive the
employers of an honest tool which they were using for a dishonest purpose,
and I cannot pronounce the legislation void, as based on a false assumption,
since I know nothing about the matter one way or another." Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 124 (1891). See Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REv. 683; Dobyns, Justice
Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 !1,1,. L. R.!,!v. 71.
Gs He still 1inds himself dissenting, however, as in the case of Truax v.
Corrigan, supra, in which he said : "The dangers of a delusive exactness in
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment have been adverted to before
now. * * * Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law. * * *
I must add one general consideration. There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an
important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded
by the several states, even though the experiments may see1't futile or even
noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect'' (page 158).
6 0 219 U. S. I04, III (1911).
.
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inspection and the above described cooperation are necessary safeguards, this court certainly cannot say that it is wrong."
In 1915 an Illinois statute forbidding the sale of food preservatives containing boric acid was held -by the Supreme Court not to
violate the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 "The contention of the plaintiff in error,'' said Mr. Justice Hughes, "could
be granted only if it appeared that by a consensus of opinion the
preservative was unquestionably harmless with respect to its contemplated uses; that is, that dt indubitably must be classed as a
wholesome article of commerce so innocuous in its designed use
and so unrelated in any way to any possible danger to the public
health that the enactment must be considered as a merely arbitrary
interference with the property and liberty of the citizen. It is
plainly not enough that the subject should be regarded as debatable.
If it be debatable, the legiislature is entitled to its own judgment,
and that judgment is not to be superseded by the verdict of a jury
upon the issue which the legislature has decided."
In sustaining a state statute prohibiting the trading-stamp busi
ness against the charge that it was class legislation which denied
the equal protection of the law, the court said :71 "It is established
that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed."
This position has been assumed even more strikingly in recent
cases in which the courts have had to determine whether certain
businesses were so affected with a public interest that legislative
regulation could be supported, or whether taxes were being spent
for a public purpose. The tendency to treat the legislative conclusions more and more as conclusive seems apparent. In Ger'1nan
Alliance I11surance Co. v. Lewis, decided in 1914,72 the courb
alluded to the fact that the state legislatures throughout the country
had come to regard the business of insurance as affected with a public interest. "A conception so general," said the court, "cannot be
wtlthout cause. The universal sense of a people cannot be acciPrice v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 452 (1915).
Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342, 357 (1916).
72 233 u. s. 389, 412 (1914).
70
71
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dental; its persistence saves it from the charge of unconsidered
impulse." And we are not surprised to find the court adopting the
legislative view. In the recent cases sustaining the legislative control of rents and housing during the war-time emergency, we find
this same point of view very strongly suggested. Judge Hough of
the United States district court in New York, after commenting
upon the doctrine of public user announced in the German Alliance
Insurance Co. case, went on to say :73 "Since this pronouncement,
and its legitimate and logical sequel, the 'trading stamp' case, it
may be and has been asserted that any business is affected with a
public interest as soon as the electorate become sufficiently interested in it to pass a regulatory statute. It is not necessary to go
so far, but we must and do hold that the business of renting out
living space is quite as suitable for statutory regulation, is as much
affected with a public interest, as fire !insurance and trading stamps."
And in discussing the alleged discriminatory features of the law
Judge Hough declared bluntly: "If the power of classification by
the legislature was ever judicially limited,- the effort has been abandoned, unless some limitation can be found !in the statement that a
distinction is arbitrary where no 'state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it.' "
When the housing legislation came before the Supreme Court,
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for th~ court, declared :74 "No doubt
1it is true that a legislative declaration of facts that are material
only as a ground for enacting a rule of law, for instance that a
certain use is a public one, may not be held conclusive by the courts.
* * * But a declaration by a legislature concerning public conditions that, by necessity and duty, it must know, is entitled at least to
great respect. In this !instance Congress stated a publicly notorious
and almost world-wide fact. That the emergency declared by the
statute did exist must be assumed."75
And in the case of Green v. Frazier, decided in 1920, the Supreme
Court, in upholding the Non-partisan League program in North
Dakota against the claim that it involved taxation for a private
purpose, stated that "what was or was not a public use was a ques73

Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 3o6, 3r7 (r920).
Block v. Hirsh, 65 L. Ed. Sup. Ct. Rep, 53I, 532 (I92I).
75 Writer's italics.
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tion concerning which local authority, legislative and judicial, had
especial means of securing information to enable them to form a
judgment; and particularly that the judgment of the highest court
of the state, declaring a given use to be public in its nature, would
be accepted by this court unless clearly unfounded." 76
The writer is aware that there is nothing particularly revolutionary in any of these statements. Viiewed separately, their importance seems slight. Their significance is cumulative. They give
evidence of a growing willingness on the part of the court to regard
social and economic legislation as constitutional unless some palpable and egregious defect ~n it be visible. More and more reliance '
is being placed upon the correctness of legislative determination:
As contrasted with earlier decisions, these recent opinions are to
be distinguished perhaps only by the degree of respect accorded
the legislature. But differences of degree sometimes are substantial enough to amount to ·differences of kind; and an examination
of the cases has convinced the writer that a movement towards a
new judicial attitude toward the social and economic interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment has clearly· set in.
It merely remains to evaluate this new attitude of the courts.
Is it a weak-kneed abdication of a judicial authority which ought
to be exercised? Or is it a wholesome return to a sound appreciation of the proper sphere of judicial action? This is a question
about which men will, of course, disagree v.igorously. It seems to
the writer, however, that the new movement is wige and salutary.
It represents, in the first place, a wholesome readjustment of the
relations which ought to exist and which always should have existed
between the courts and the legislatures. By regarding the findings
of the legislature upon questions of social and economic fact as
conclusive in the absence of some flagrant abuse of discretion, the
courts abandon the position of trying to settle questions of social
and economic policy, which they are wholly unfitted to settle, and
leave those questions, together with the responsibility for their solution, where it belongs, upon the legislatures. In the second place,
such a readjustment as this would help immeasurably fo building
up again that popular confidence in the courts which we have seen
has been to some extent lost. Finally, it would greatly aid in
76
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rehabilitating the feeble sense of responsibility which legislators
assume in respect to the constitutionality of the laws they pass.
By the firm establishment" of such a salutary judicial tradition as
this new attitude of the courts bids fair to establish, the writer
believes that we would correct the only actual defects which have
ever existed in our system of judicial review, and we would correct
them without resorting t~ any of the more radical and questionable
devices, such as the recall of judges or decisions, which have from
time to time been proposed.77
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7 7 "When the lawyer refuses to act intelligently, unintelligent application
of the legislative steam-roller by the layman is the alternative." Pound.
The Spirit of the Common Law, preface xiv.

